

## **THE END OF COMMUNICATIVE CERTAINTY?**

### **Warrior Politics, Pagan Ethos and “Operation Shock and Awe”.**

by

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#### **1. Introduction**

The United States has been mired in a crisis with multiple dimensions, a crisis that is getting deeper and more complex all the time. First of all, over the past few decades American industry has been suffering from a drop in its competitiveness vis-à-vis Europe and Asia. A beginning with the end of the cold war, the traditional allies of the U.S. have been gradually distancing themselves from the former patron. The U.S. also has an internal crisis of legitimacy of the co-called neoliberal model, formerly called Reaganomics but now official doctrine of both parties, thanks to rising social polarization (unemployment, crime, corruption) and scandals like Enron, WorldCom, etc. Finally, there are President Bush's crisis of electoral legitimacy, and the current deep recession of the U.S. economy.

With so many problems, should we be surprised that the current US Administration should be launching a war? One of the oldest tactics of American presidents is to use war to stimulate the economy and distract people's attention from problems at home. But by looking a little deeper, one also finds close links between the war and accompanying militarization, and the fanatical American push for so-called "free trade" policies at any cost.

The present debate over "regime change" in Iraq conceals a little known irony—it offers a cast of characters and a reprise of arguments that shaped an earlier invasion of that country. The invasion in question was not the Gulf War of 1991—rather, it was the British invasion of 1941. Thus, maintaining relations with Iraq has been a problem with the British a long time ago.

**Maintaining relations** with other countries is the main task of every Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Part of this involves furthering the cultural, scientific and economic interests of the country. Information related to diplomatic tasks and to vital national interests may be of tremendous value and in certain cases may be highly relevant to the political future of a nation. It is not meant for public airing; even less for unauthorized ears. This information needs the highest protection available so that its communicative certainty is assured.

**In times of crisis**, access to and use of public infrastructure abroad may be restricted or impossible. Satellite communications may be an answer, but might be risky, depending on who controls the satellite - and anyhow all satellite links are systematically tapped. In such situations, the good old short-wave radio link has proven its advantages in terms of autonomy and reliability for both ciphered voice and



data communication. Securing satellite links is a specialty of Crypto AG and securing short-wave radio networks a tradition. Diplomats and diplomatic delegations spend much time travelling which confronts them with difficult communication security problems. These security considerations explain the muffled nature of communication among the US, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia over the stakes on the War against Iraq. All these countries are talking and acting in defense of what they conventionally call **National Interest**. And their conflicting national interests have split the coalition and anti-coalition groups in word and deed over the recolonization of Iraq.

## 2. Language and Diplomacy

Language is one of our most basic instincts. From birth humans communicate, at first in order to survive - to ensure that needs are met. But at an amazing rate communication becomes refined into language, one of the defining characteristics of human beings. In *The Language Instinct* Stephen Pinker (1994: 16) writes:

*In any natural history of the human species, language would stand out as the pre-eminent trait... A common language connects the members of a community into an information-sharing network with formidable collective powers. Anyone can benefit from the strokes of genius, lucky accidents, and trial-and-error wisdom accumulated by everyone else, present or past. And people can work in teams, their efforts coordinated by negotiated agreements.*

As Pinker points out, language is what allows us to build on the work of others, benefiting from their knowledge and

collaborating to achieve more than one person can alone. The processes of diplomacy - communicating, negotiating, reaching and formulating agreements, collecting, creating, transmitting and recording knowledge - all depend on language.

Studies of diplomacy usually concentrate on the message rather than the means. However, examination of language use in diplomacy can lead to a better understanding of the way diplomacy functions and why some diplomatic processes are more successful than others. Through careful and critical attention to various aspects of diplomatic language we can improve our understanding of both the explicit and implicit messages world leaders and other political figures send out, and improve our own ability to communicate in the most effective and appropriate ways concerning issues of critical national interest. Diplomatic communication and language has its historical significance right from the birth of the Westphalian nation-state system in 1648.

Following the peace of **Westphalia** in Europe in the seventeenth century, it was around language, the vernacular, that the modern state system arose. Language, which was always an important component of the personality of men and nations, became yet more important: an essential, indeed very vital component in the identity of individuals, groups and nations. In Moslem culture and civilization the centrality of the Arabic language cannot be over emphasized. The miracle of the Holy Quran is associated with the very essence, structure, nuances and rendition of the Arabic language itself. It is significant that the first word in it is a command to the faithful that says, Iqra', **Read**.



Why man, of all God's creatures was able to articulate a sophisticated language as a medium of communication, beyond mere sounds or gestures, is one of the most puzzling mysteries of creation. The language of diplomacy is yet a further refinement of language as a medium of communication. For words, however innocent or neutral they may look on paper or when standing alone, can be quite explosive, emotive, calming, agitating or even revolutionary. Words, which can mean different things to different people, or even change from place to place, or from time to time, carry not only sound but also intention. They can please, cajole or wound in defense of National Interest.

### 3. Defining the National Interest

Sometimes geopoliticians act as though determining the national interest were an arcane science, or at least an occult art. But there is nothing mysterious about the national interest. It is simply the set of interests that are claimed to be widely shared by people in any country in their relations with the rest of the world. The national interest is said to be broader than private interests, though it is hardly surprising that various groups try to equate their interests with the national interest. And despite what self-proclaimed realists say, the national interest is broader than protection against geopolitical threats. The strategic interest is part of, but not necessarily identical to, the national interest. In a democracy the national interest is what a majority, after discussion and debate, decides are its legitimate long-run shared interests in relation to the outside world. This conception is both tenable and acceptable if the nation has not been highjacked by particularistic interests being bandied about as National Interest.

The argument of this paper therefore is that truth is always the first casualty in cases of diplomatic crisis. Another casualty is conscience. The reason for this grim situation is that during crisis or war rulers seek to maintain their power by resorting to immoral tactics and strategies in the name of realism. According to Hans Morgenthau, a foreign policy based on a realistic appraisal of the national interest will avoid both the dangers of hazardous timidity and "the blindness of crusading frenzy (that) destroys nations and civilizations-in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself" (Morgenthau,1992:11). Thus, in reality, diplomatic language is used to curtain off morality, idealism, and Godliness in the name of National Interest.

#### **4. Who Benefits From Keeping Saddam Hussein In Power?**

France saw in the threat of war against Iraq what Washington tried to conceal: unbridled US hegemony over the Middle East and its oil resources. Despite US assurances, France did not buy the argument that once Saddam Hussein is removed, the US would hold the Iraqi oil "in trust" for those with vested interests -- meaning France and Russia. France believes that a devastating war, and its chaotic aftermath, would breed instability, with tens of thousands of refugees drifting to Europe.

France has used multilateralism to its advantage. It is concerned about dragging Europe into a war that would be damaging to its interests and might conceivably trigger a new bout of terrorism. The US, in pre-emption of the inspectors' reports, has promoted a unilateralist military campaign against Iraq, with or without international consensus. France, on the



other hand, is building bridges with other European Union (EU) allies, especially Germany, in order to isolate not only the US but also Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is increasingly being perceived as Washington's Trojan horse in Europe, much to the embarrassment of his own countrymen. Most Britons remain unconvinced of Tony Blair's case for war against Iraq and are baffled by the extreme lengths to which he has gone in turning his back on Europe to win Washington's favor. The recent Franco-German reconciliation and their projected unity on the situation in Iraq has ostracized Britain for risking European interests and sounded the alarm on US ambitions in a historically sensitive region. Meanwhile, on the eve of President Bush's State of the Union address in 2003, the American public was evenly divided on who should be trusted with the war-against-Iraq decision, with 47 per cent with President Bush and 47 per cent wanting the decision to be left to the UN.

Blix's progress report, more than El- Baradei's, was quite critical of Iraq. It has faulted Baghdad for a failure to genuinely accept the requirements for disarmament. It pointed to gaps in Iraq's accounting for chemical and biological weapons production. Furthermore, it criticized Iraq's provision of inadequate information on missile manufacturing and testing ranges, the extent of its cooperation in allowing aerial surveillance and the freedom to interview Iraqi scientists in private. The report gave Washington powerful, but temporary ammunition for its case against Iraq.

Russia, Germany and France, on the other hand, saw in both reports a persuasive argument for the continuation of inspections and called for Iraqi cooperation. The French Permanent Representative to the UN, and former President of the Security Council, Jean-Marc de la Sabliere, said after the

Blix-Baradei briefing that the mechanism set up by resolution 1441, "is producing results". In a clear rift with Washington, he added that the resolution contained "no time-limit" on the work of the inspectors -- a rejection of the "time is running out" declaration. President Jacques Chirac said he would do everything possible to avoid war and the EU formally endorsed France's position for the continuation of inspections. So, where does this leave Iraq, the US and the international community? The war is going on fiercely against Iraq. But, what has the anti-coalition got to lose? The losses to be incurred by France, Germany, Russia, and China will be enormous as follows:

**a) France**

France controls over 22.5 percent of Iraq's imports.[1] French total trade with Iraq under the oil-for-food program is the third largest, totaling \$3.1 billion since 1996, according to the United Nations.[2] In 2001 France became Iraq's largest European trading partner.

- Roughly 60 French companies do an estimated \$1.5 billion in trade with Baghdad annually under the U.N. oil-for-food program.[3]
- France's largest oil company, Total Fina Elf, has negotiated a deal to develop the Majnoon field in western Iraq. The Majnoon field purportedly contains up to 30 billion barrels of oil.[4]
- Total Fina Elf also negotiated a deal for future oil exploration in Iraq's Nahr Umar field. Both the Majnoon and Nahr Umar fields are estimated to contain as much as 25 percent of the country's reserves.[5]
- France's Alcatel company, a major telecom firm, is negotiating a \$76 million contract to rehabilitate Iraq's telephone system.[6]



- From 1981 to 2001, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), France was responsible for over 13 percent of Iraq's arms imports.[7]

#### b) Germany

- Direct trade between Germany and Iraq amounts to about \$350 million annually, and another \$1 billion is reportedly sold through third parties.[8]
- It has recently been reported that Saddam Hussein has ordered Iraqi domestic businesses to show preference to German companies as a reward for Germany's "firm positive stand in rejecting the launching of a military attack against Iraq." It was also reported that over 101 German companies were present at the Baghdad Annual exposition.[9]
- During the 35th Annual Baghdad International Fair in November 2002, a German company signed a contract for \$80 million for 5,000 cars and spare parts.[10]
- In 2002, DaimlerChrysler was awarded over \$13 million in contracts for German trucks and spare parts.[11]
- German officials are investigating a German corporation accused of illegally channeling weapons to Iraq via Jordan. The equipment in question is used for boring the barrels of large cannons and is allegedly intended for Saddam Hussein's Al Fao Supercannon project.[12]

### c) Russia

Russia controls roughly 5.8 percent of Iraq's annual imports.[13] Under the U.N. oil-for-food program, Russia's total trade with Iraq was somewhere between \$530 million and \$1 billion for the six months ending in December of 2001.[14]

- According to the Russian Ambassador to Iraq, Vladimir Titorenko, new contracts worth another \$200 million under the U.N. oil-for-food program are to be signed over the next three months.[15]
- Soviet-era debt of \$7 billion through \$8 billion was generated by arms sales to Iraq during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war.
- Russia's LUKoil negotiated a \$4 billion, 23-year contract in 1997 to rehabilitate the 15 billion-barrel West Qurna field in southern Iraq. Work on the oil field was expected to commence upon cancellation of U.N. sanctions on Iraq. The deal is currently on hold.[16]
- In October 2001, Salvneft, a Russian–Belarus company, negotiated a \$52 million service contract to drill at the Tuba field in Southern Iraq.[17]
- In April 2001, Russia's Zaruezhneft company received a service contract to drill in the Saddam, Kirkuk, and Bai Hassan fields to rehabilitate the fields and reduce water incursion.
- A future \$40 billion Iraqi–Russian economic agreement, reportedly signed in 2002, would allow for extensive oil exploration opportunities throughout western Iraq.[18] The proposal calls for 67 new projects, over a 10-year time frame, to explore and further develop fields in southern Iraq and the Western Desert, including the Suba, Luhais, West Qurna, and Rumaila projects. Additional projects added to the deal



include second-phase construction of a pipeline running from southern to northern Iraq, and extensive drilling and gas projects. Work on these projects would commence upon cancellation of sanctions.[19]

- Russia's Gazprom company over the past few years has signed contracts worth \$18 million to repair gas stations in Iraq.[20]
- The former Soviet Union was the premier supplier of Iraqi arms. From 1981 to 2001, Russia supplied Iraq with 50 percent of its arms.[21]

#### d) China

China controls roughly 5.8 percent of Iraq's annual imports.[22]

- China National Oil Company, partnered with China North Industries Corp., negotiated a 22-year-long deal for future oil exploration in the Al Ahdab field in southern Iraq.[23]
- In recent years, the Chinese Aero-Technology Import-Export Company (CATIC) has been contracted to sell "meteorological satellite" and "surface observation" equipment to Iraq. This contract was approved by the U.N. oil-for-food program.[24]
- CATIC also won approval from the U.N. in July 2000 to sell \$2 million worth of fiber optic cables. This and similar contracts approved were disguised as telecommunications gear. These cables can be used for secure data and communications links between national command and control centers and long-range search radar, targeting radar, and missile-launch units, according to U.S. officials. In addition, China National Electric Wire & Cable and China National Technical Import Telecommunications Equipment Company are

believed to have sold Iraq \$6 million and \$15.5 million worth of communications equipment and other unspecified supplies, respectively.[25]

According to a report from SIPRI, from 1981 to 2001, China was the second largest supplier of weapons and arms to Iraq, supplying over 18 percent of Iraq's weapons imports.[26]

From the above evidence, one can therefore judge that Iraq's elaborate economic links with France, Germany, Russia, and China provoked Britain( the former colonial master) into siding heedlessly with the US in realization of the latter's pet dream of American Internationalism, a theory of economic, military, ideological and political conquest of the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

### **5. British Old Grudges Resurrected**

In May 1941, in the midst of a World War, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered his reluctant Commander-in-Chief for the Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, to march on Baghdad to effect a "regime change." The British Prime Minister's arguments reflected many of those same concerns expressed today by members of the George W. Bush administration: British intervention would "pre-empt" Axis support for Rachid Ali, a violently anti-British Arab nationalist whose government threatened Britain's strategic position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It would strike a blow at a terrorist challenge orchestrated by a charismatic Islamic cleric. British intervention also would protect oil reserves vital to the British war effort. Furthermore, Churchill was willing to wave aside offers of third-party mediation in favor of a "unilateralist" approach. Conversely, Wavell's arguments against an invasion



of Iraq mirrored contemporary objections—he simply lacked the resources to add Iraq to an impossibly extensive list of military commitments. A military attack, Wavell believed, would make Britain's position in the Middle East less, not more, secure. Better let sleeping dogs lie and take care of pressing business elsewhere (Pollack:2002).

The story of Churchill's 1941 invasion of Iraq begins in 1930. In that year, the British accorded sovereignty to Iraq, making it the first of the former Turkish colonies in the Middle East to gain independence. But the British retained an important concession from the newly independent Iraqi government. Because of Iraq's important geographic position as an air link and alternative land passage via Basra and Baghdad between India and British-controlled Palestine and the Suez canal, an Anglo-Iraqi treaty allowed London to transit troops through Iraq, and required Baghdad to "give all aid, including the use of railways, rivers, ports and airfields," in the event of war. Baghdad also undertook to provide internal security, especially to protect the vital pipelines that ran from the Mosul and Kirkuk oilfields of northern Iraq to Haifa on the Mediterranean coast. By 1937, British presence in Iraq had been reduced to two RAF bases, one at Shaibah, close to the southern port of Basra, and the other at Habbaniya, on the Euphrates about twenty-five miles west of Baghdad. Nevertheless, Iraqi army officers, organized into a secret association known as the Golden Square, regarded the residual British presence in their country and the commercial and diplomatic privileges ceded to London in the 1930 treaty as an insulting vestige of imperialism.

By treaty, Iraq should have sided with Britain on the outbreak of World War II in 1939. But the government of the 4-year old King of Iraq, directed by his uncle who served as

Regent, proved too feeble to surmount the opposition of pro-Italian Prime Minister Rashid Ali el Gailani, a lawyer and co-founder of the Muslim Brotherhood whose cells were active throughout the Middle East. Axis triumphs early in the war and the arrival of an Italian Armistice Commission to monitor Vichy French forces in neighboring Syria only strengthened Rashid Ali's position. When Churchill's War Cabinet recommended the precautionary dispatch of a division from India to occupy Basra, Wavell objected that the appearance of British troops would only enflame hair-trigger Iraqi nationalism. Wavell's obstruction left Iraq's vulnerable Royal Air Force (RAF) bases guarded only by a locally recruited constabulary backed by armored cars. For London, the situation in Baghdad was just one piece in a complex Middle East jigsaw that stretched from Cairo to Teheran. Following the fall of France in June 1940, the entry of Italy into the war, and the RAF's victory in the subsequent Battle of Britain, the focus of the war between Great Britain and the European Axis had shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean. And while Britain enjoyed strengths there, most notably in the Royal Navy based in Alexandria, its major vulnerability resided in the political volatility of a region that London feared was ripe for Axis exploitation.

Of particular concern to Britain were the intrigues of Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who had eventually sought refuge in Baghdad after being exiled from Palestine in October 1937. Al-Husseini's delicate features and gentle manner accentuated by his deep blue eyes, trim goatee and soothing voice, camouflaged a zealous and violent disposition. An ex-Ottoman artillery officer turned school teacher, al-Husseini had been sentenced by the British to ten years imprisonment for his part in orchestrating the 1920 anti-



Jewish riots in Jerusalem. In an act of misplaced generosity, however, the British had pardoned him and allowed him to stand for Grand Mufti the following year, an office that normally went to a jurist whose task was to adjudicate disputes by issuing interpretations of Koranic law.

The British calculated that, because al-Husseini had no following in the Arab community, they had nothing to lose. It proved a desperate mistake. As Grand Mufti, al-Husseini was poised to exploit Arab-Jewish tensions that sharpened considerably with the surge of Jewish immigration into Palestine in the 1930s. His anti-British and anti-Semitic venom found a receptive audience among a rising Palestinian middle class, ironically an offspring of economic activity stimulated by Jews, who looked to the Mufti for political leadership. He directed squads of hit men to attack Jewish settlements and assassinate moderate Arabs, who urged compromise, men increasingly marginalized by the recrudescence of Islamic fundamentalism. As President of the Supreme Muslim Council, the most authoritative Palestinian religious body, the Mufti controlled appointments to Muslim schools, courts, and significant trust funds that he used, among other things, to spread his message in Iraq and Syria, and to purchase arms.

The Mufti also benefited from the downturn in Britain's international fortunes. From 1938, Germany, Italy and even Spain stoked the glowing embers of Arab nationalism with radio broadcasts, "cultural" subsidies and anti-Semitic articles that the Mufti translated and distributed through Muslim schools. Palestinian Arabs imitated fascist political organizations and praised German racial laws, failing to appreciate that Hitler was Zionism's best recruiting sergeant, one who actually exacerbated their problems. Rather, they dreamed of the day when Italy and Germany would eject

Britain, and with them the Jews, from the Middle East. By the outbreak of war in 1940, Palestine boiled with rebellion — 20,000 British soldiers struggled to keep order between Muslim extremists who turned much of Jerusalem into a no-go area, and Jewish militants like Moshe Dayan whose *Haganah* ("Defense"), organized and trained by the pro-Zionist Scots Captain Orde Wingate, led reprisal raids against the Mufti's supporters as far away as Syria and Lebanon.

By the spring of 1941, the combination of Arab nationalism among Iraqi officers, the Grand Mufti's intrigues and propaganda, and tensions created by Rachid Ali anti-British posturing had brought Iraq to the brink of civil war. On the night of 31 March 1941, tipped off that army officers planned to move against him, the Regent escaped across the Tigris in a motor boat and made his way to the RAF base at Habbaniya, from which he was flown to Basra and the asylum of the H.M.S. *Cockchafer*. On 3 April, Rashid Ali el Gailani seized power with the help of Army and Air Force officers of the Golden Square and proclaimed the National Defense Government. He sent a note to the British ambassador warning against any intervention in Iraq's internal affairs and dispatched a force to Basra to deny British troops landing rights there.

The *coup* in Baghdad threatened British interests for at least three reasons: it severed the vital air link, and a supplemental land route, between India and Egypt. It endangered the vital oil supply from the northern Iraq oilfields upon which British defense of the Mediterranean depended. Finally, an Arab nationalist success in Iraq could prove contagious and subvert Britain's tenuous political position in Egypt and Palestine. Against this potential threat, the harassed Wavell argued that he had his hands full with four genuine



crises—he had to coordinate the evacuation of Greece and prepare Crete's defenses to withstand an imminent German airdrop predicted by Ultra intelligence, and put the final preparations on an impending offensive against Italian forces in East Africa. Furthermore, Erwin Rommel's *Afrika Korps* had launched an offensive into Cyrenaica and invested the British garrison at Tobruk. In Wavell's view, even if had the troops to spare, this was hardly the moment to stoke Arab opinion with an ill-advised intervention in Iraq.

### 6. Who Loses From Saddam Hussein Being in Power?

The US economic and strategic interests have suffered greatly with Saddam Hussein's tenure as President of Iraq since he bid goodbye to America. Hence, President George Bush is attempting to save the dollar as a world currency. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC) controls oil pricing by manipulating supply so that the price stays high. Iraq and Iran both have enormous oil and gas reserves. OPEC has made significant strides towards switching to the Euro as the standard currency for the purchase of oil. This is very important. Because Iraq has already switched their food for dollars reserve to the Euro and plans to completely switch All of its reserve currency to the Euro. Iran has announced its intentions to do the same.

How does this affect America?. The dollar used to be worth more than the Euro. 75% of the world's reserve currency is in Dollars. Only the USA makes dollars. That is why America is the prevalent superpower. The entire world must have U.S. Dollars to purchase oil. The European Union is a trade union between European countries; it is growing at a startling rate. It has recently accepted 10 new members

(countries). It is on the verge of overtaking the U.S. as an economic/ trade power. The Euro surpassed the Dollars in worth in 2002. As more countries continue to join the European Union which only uses the Euro, OPEC becomes more likely to switch to the Euro as an oil currency standard. This switch will completely devastate the Dollar's worth as a currency. Countries all over the world would have to dump their reserve dollars back into the market in favor of the Euro so they could continue to buy oil from OPEC. This would mean instant market crash, massive inflation, near stoppage of imports due primarily to the massive and exploding deficits/debts America already owes.

Countries that are enemies of the U.S. will continue to switch, as they know they are striking a blow to the U.S. simply by doing so. This is inevitable. The switch is inevitable. Iraq has pledged one billion Euro to the Palestinians. The European Union is also giving millions of Euro to the Palestinians so that the other OPEC countries will continue to switch to the Euro. If America wants to keep her standing as the Premier Superpower, she must take over Iraqi oil production - the 2nd largest oil reserves verified, and a humongous reserve that has yet to have it's size verified. Bush intends to push Iraqi oil production way beyond the OPEC limits so that the price of oil will drop. With the U.S. in control of pricing (the goal) she can break up OPEC, then there will be a much bigger incentive to stay with the dollar as a standard currency.

If the world switches to the Euro, America will collapse with its economy. America will not have the economic power that she currently wields over the rest of the world when she wants something (buying their allegiance). If America does



not have economic power, she will not be able to prevent nuclear proliferation among its declared Enemies. Iran just announced that it was building a uranium enrichment facility. This is a precursor for the building of nuclear weapons. North Korea has begun a new nuclear weapons program. India is already a nuclear power and has established an agreement with Iran called the Indian-Iran Accord. They will protect each other and provide bases for military action in the event of a war. India is already at war with Pakistan. Iran is on the other side of Pakistan. This means that one small nuclear power is surrounded by one humongous enemy nuclear power and a humongous enemy that is going nuclear. For this reason Pakistan is cooperating with the US very generously toward the War on Terror. They want the U.S. to protect them from attack by India and Iran. Iran is a sworn enemy of Israel, Iraq wants to become nuclear. Israel is a small country of 6 million people and feels automatically threatened by Iran and Iraq, worse so should both go nuclear.

India has over 280 million men available for military service alone! Remember- Indian-Iran Accord, remains a huge threat to Israel, and to world peace from nuclear war. In other word's, if America fails to do what is necessary to keep the dollar in place as the world currency, she is likely to see the fall of the United States from power, and possible nuclear war that she would be powerless to stop.

## 7. Insecure Lone Super-Power?

The lone Super-Power, America, remains insecure. Her insecurity derives from the poltroonish situations in other countries around the world. One decade after the dismantling of the USSR and its restoration of capitalism, the death rate of Russia exceeds its birthrate. South America, a laboratory where

the International Monetary Fund has gleefully practiced its anti-social experiments, is in a state of economic disintegration. In Southern Africa, a substantial portion of the population is infected with the HIV virus. According to the World Bank,

*The AIDS crisis is having a devastating impact on developing countries, especially in Africa. Health care systems weakened by the impact of AIDS, along with conflict and poor management cannot cope with traditional illnesses. Malaria and tuberculosis continue to kill millions malaria alone is estimated to reduce GDP growth rates by 0.5 per year on average in Sub-Saharan Africa. Life expectancy in the region fell from 50 years in 1987 to 47 years in 1999; in the countries hardest hit by AIDS (such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Lesotho) the average lifespan was cut short by more than ten years.[27]*

These catastrophic conditions are the product of the capitalist system and the rule of the market. The strategic document acknowledges in passing that half of the human race lives on less than \$2 a day, but, as to be expected, the prescription drawn up by the current US Bush administration is the more intensive application of the economic policies that are responsible for the misery that exists all over the world.

Defining its idea of a distinctly **American Internationalism**, the document states that "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone..." In another passage, the document warns that the United States



will take the actions necessary to ensure that its efforts to meet her global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept. In other words, the actions of the leaders of the United States will not be restrained by the conventions of international law.

### a) Lessons from Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal

In a study of the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal, Telford Taylor who worked as an assistant of the chief American prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson wrote that the laws of war do not apply only to the suspected criminals of vanquished nations. There is no moral or legal basis for immunizing nations from scrutiny. The laws of war are not a one-way street.[28] The refusal of the United States to recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court is of immense international political significance, and testifies to the acute awareness of American leaders today that their policies are of a criminal character and could subject them, if international law were enforced, to the most severe penalties.

As Telford Taylor stresses, the prosecution of the Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg trials was based on a new legal concept: that their planning for and decision to wage aggressive war constituted a crime. This charge took precedence even over the counts in the indictments that were related to the atrocities committed by the Nazis against Jews, civilians in occupied countries, and prisoners of war. In a memorandum prepared by Taylor arguing in support of indicting Nazi leaders for planning aggressive war, he wrote:

*Only the most incorrigible legalists can pretend to be shocked by the conclusion that the perpetrator of an aggressive war acts at peril of being punished for his perpetration, even if no tribunal has ever previously decided that perpetration of an aggressive war is a crime.[29]*

Taylor continued:

*It is important that the trial not become an inquiry into the causes of the war. It cannot be established that Hitlerism was the sole cause of the war, and there should be no effort to do this. Nor, I believe, should there be any effort or time spent on apportioning out responsibility for causing the war among the many nations and individuals concerned. The question of causation is important and will be discussed for many years, but it has no place in this trial, which must stick rigorously to the doctrine that planning and launching an aggressive war is illegal, whatever may be the factors that caused the defendants to plan and to launch. Contributing causes may be pleaded by the defendants before the bar of history, but not before the tribunal[30]*

This issue is of extraordinary importance today and not only in relation to the present ongoing and an unprovoked American war against Iraq. If the precedent established at Nuremberg has any contemporary relevance, the entire strategy elaborated in this document proceeds outside the bounds of international law. The essential claim asserted in this



document, which serves as the foundation of American strategy, is the right of the United States to take unilateral military action against another country without offering credible evidence that it is acting to prevent a clear and verifiable threat of attack. This assertion of all-encompassing powers to resort to violence whenever it decides to do so is justified with loosely-constructed diplomatic language that cannot withstand even a cursory analysis: We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.

Who defines what a "rogue state" is? Is it any state that challenges, directly or indirectly, American interests? A list of all those countries that the Bush administration considers to be rogue states, not to mention potential rogue states, is a very long one. This list certainly includes Cuba. It might even, after the reelection of Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor, include Germany!

Understandably, there is no precise definition of terrorist. This is a term that is notoriously vague and subject to political manipulation. Moreover, what standard of evidence will be required to establish a link between a so-called rogue state and a terrorist client before the United States attacks the former? Just the other day, the president, his national security adviser and the secretary of defense announced that there is a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, without providing any factual substantiation to support this claim, and in contradiction to what is actually known about the antagonistic attitude of Iraq's secular regime toward Islamic fundamentalist organizations.

Finally, the assertion of the right to take military action against rogue states in the name of "pre-emptive war" and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons

of mass destruction can only mean that the United States claims the right to attack whatever state it identifies as a potential threat. Though a state may not be, at present, a threat to the United States; though it may not at the present time be planning, let alone actively preparing an attack against the United States, it may still be a legitimate target for an attack if the US government identifies it as a potential or embryonic threat to America's national security.

A definition of threat that requires no overt action against the United States, but merely the potential to become a threat at some point in the future, would place virtually every country in the world on the list of possible targets for an American attack. This is not an exaggeration. The document speaks not only of enemies but also of potential adversaries, and warns them not to pursue a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. It directly warns China against attempting to acquire advanced military capabilities, asserting that by doing so China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness that is, it will emerge as a threat that may require a preemptive military response by the United States.

While the report tells China that the pursuit of advanced military capabilities means "following an outdated path", it proclaims hypocritically just two pages later that it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength: "We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. And this project entails a vast expansion of America's military presence throughout the world. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond



Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces”.

The document asserts repeatedly that the new doctrine of preemptive strikes against existing and/or potential threats, and the abandonment of the previous doctrine of deterrence is a necessary response to the events of September 11, 2001, when the United States suddenly confronted a new, unprecedented and unimagined danger. The nature of the Cold War threat, the report asserts, required the United States “... to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation”. Somewhat later, the document describes the Soviet Union as a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense.

Those for whom the 1980s is comparatively recent history, who still remember the 1960s, and even happen to know a few things about the history of the 1950s, these are remarkable words. Those unfamiliar with the history of the Cold War would hardly imagine that the authors of this strategic document who now describe the USSR in almost nostalgic terms as a status quo, risk-averse adversary against whom a gentlemanly and polite deterrence was effective are more or less the same people who, as recently as the 1980s, were describing the Soviet Union as the focus of evil against whom the United States had to prepare for all-out war. The present US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was closely associated with the right-wing Committee for the Present Danger, formed in the 1970s, which was bitterly opposed to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. This

organization demanded a massive military build-up against the USSR, and argued that it was possible for the United States to wage and win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration's sponsorship of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known as Star Wars, arose from the demand of extreme right-wing elements in the Republican Party among whom are now to be found the principal dramatis personae who direct the policies of the Bush administration, especially Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz for the development of technology that would make it possible for the United States to consider the use of nuclear weapons against the USSR a viable military option.

Here lies the historical falsification and political deception that underlies the Bush administration's National Security Strategy that the policies outlined in the report are essentially a response to the events of September 11, determined and shaped by the inescapable military obligations imposed upon the United States by the threat of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Far from being an exceptional response to the events of September 11, 2001, the plan for world domination outlined in the National Security Strategy of the Bush administration has been in development for more than a decade.



## b) Liquidation of the USSR

The origins of this National Security Strategy unveiled recently can be dated back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This had for the United States the most far-reaching significance. For nearly three-quarters of a century, the fate of American imperialism and the Soviet Union were inextricably linked. The October Revolution that brought the Bolshevik Party to power followed by only a few months the April 1917 entry of the United States into World War I. Thus, from the earliest days of its emergence as the principal imperialist power, the United States confronted the reality of a workers' state that proclaimed the advent of a new historical epoch of world socialist revolution. Despite the Stalinist bureaucracy's subsequent betrayal of the revolutionary internationalist ideals initially proclaimed by Lenin and Trotsky, the political aftershocks produced by the overthrow of capitalism in Russia continued to reverberate for decades in the growth of the social consciousness and political militancy of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries, including the United States, and in the wave of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles that swept across the globe, especially in the aftermath of World War II.

Though it emerged from World War II as the leader of world capitalism, the United States was not in a position to organize the world as it saw fit. The initial expectation that the possession of the atomic bomb would enable the United States to intimidate and, if need be, destroy the Soviet Union was shattered by the Soviet production of a nuclear device in 1949. The victory of the Chinese Revolution that same year represented a devastating blow to America's expectation that it would exercise unchallenged sway over Asia.

Throughout the early years of the Cold War a bitter battle raged within the ruling circles of the US government over how to deal with the Soviet Union. The ferocious anticommunist witch-hunting and political purges of the late 1940s and early 1950s were key elements of the environment in which this debate took place. A substantial faction of the ruling elite advocated a rollback strategy that is, the destruction of the Soviet Union and the Maoist regime in China, even if this entailed the use of nuclear weapons. Another faction, associated with the State Department theorist George F. Kennan, advocated containment.

The conflict between these factions came to a head during the Korean War, as the Truman administration came close to authorizing the use of nuclear weapons against the Chinese army. At a press conference held on November 30, 1950, Truman was asked how he intended to deal with the entry of China into the Korean War. The president replied: We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have. He was then asked specifically if that included use of the atomic bomb, to which Truman replied, that includes every weapon we have. When pressed by stunned reporters to clarify this statement, Truman reiterated that use of the atomic bomb was being actively considered.[31]

The international diplomatic uproar that ensued compelled the US government to retract Truman's statement. Finally, the Truman administration rejected General MacArthur's demand that 30 to 50 nuclear bombs be dropped on the Manchurian-Korean border to spread a belt of radioactive cobalt from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea.



This proposal was not the brainchild of one mad general. This and similar ideas had been seriously pondered and supported. Among those who publicly advocated the use of nuclear weapons was Congressman Albert Gore, Sr., the father of Clinton's Vice President. Two factors led to the decision not to use nuclear bombs in the Korean War. First, there were serious doubts that it would prove effective in the existing military situation. Second, and more decisive, was the fear that the bombing of Korea might set into motion a political chain reaction, leading to a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the remaining decades of the Cold War, the real meaning of deterrence was not what the United States prevented the USSR from doing, but what the possibility of Soviet retaliation prevented the United States from doing.

This is not an exhaustive discussion of the United States nuclear strategy during the Cold War, let alone of the Cold War as a whole. But for the purpose of understanding the events of the last decade and the present actions of the government, it must be stressed that broad sections of the American ruling class chafed under the restraints that the existence of the Soviet Union placed upon the exercise of US military power. Throughout this period, there remained a powerful constituency within what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex that pushed relentlessly for a confrontation with the Soviet Union. As already noted, many of those who presently occupy powerful positions in the Bush administration were frantically advocating a massive anti-Soviet military buildup in the 1970s and 1980s, and even arguing that a nuclear strike against the USSR had to be considered a viable option.

The increasing aggressiveness of American foreign policy was not an exclusively Republican Party project. The administration of Jimmy Carter hit upon the idea of inciting Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan in order to destabilize the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. As Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, acknowledged several years ago, American operations in Afghanistan were well under way before the Soviet Union decided to intervene militarily in that country.

One further point must be made about Soviet-American relations during the Cold War. It can be strongly and persuasively argued that the degree of American aggressiveness was related to the general state of the world capitalist economy. During the heyday of the post-World War II expansion of international capitalism, the bitter internal struggles within the American ruling elite tended to be resolved on the basis of the arguments of those who advocated compromise with the Soviet Union. To the extent that general conditions of worldwide economic expansion allowed American capitalism to operate profitably within the geopolitical framework of the so-called East-West Division, the American ruling elite made a strategic decision to avoid, or at least postpone, a nuclear confrontation with the USSR. Open military conflicts were limited to peripheral areas.

However, as world capitalism entered in the 1970s into a period of protracted stagnation and slump that arose from deep structural and systemic problems of which the present recession is an advanced symptom far more aggressive tendencies asserted themselves and found a sympathetic response within ruling circles. One might also add that the two great oil shocks of the 1970s the first occurred in 1973 as a



result of the decision of Arab states to impose a boycott on the sale of oil, the second followed the Iranian Revolution of 1979 increased the determination of the American ruling class to prevent any future disruption of its access to oil, natural gas and other essential strategic resources.

The massive military buildup of the 1980s seemed to indicate that powerful sections of the US ruling elite were willing to risk a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. This bellicose international policy was the mirror reflection of the domestic policies pursued by the Reagan administration, which initiated an aggressive and successful program of union-busting and the rollback of social reforms that had been won by the working class over the previous 50 years.

In the end, it was the Soviet bureaucracy that decided to liquidate the USSR. The self-dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 the final betrayal of the heritage of the October Revolution by the Stalinist bureaucracy created for American imperialism an unprecedented historical opportunity. For the first time it could operate in an international environment in which there did not exist any significant restraints military or political on the use of force to achieve its aims. From this point on, internal discussions on the Strategic aims of the United States were taken over by the most vicious and reactionary tendencies.

The demise of the USSR, they declared, created for the United States the opportunity to establish an unchallengeable global hegemony. The task of the United States was to exploit what right-wing columnist Charles Krauthammer referred to in 1991 as a unipolar moment to establish an absolutely dominant global position. The United States, argued Krauthammer, should not hesitate to use military power to get whatever it

wanted. The Europeans and Japanese should be treated with contempt, and compelled to recognize that they had to approach the United States as supplicants. While it might be politically advisable for US leaders to pay lip service to multilateralism, that policy was, in reality, dead. The time had come for the United States to exercise its power unilaterally, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.[32] The Anglo-American war against Iraq explains the rise of American unilateralism.

The grotesque Mr. Krauthammer probably did not realize when he wrote these words that he was vindicating a prediction made many years before by the greatest Marxist of the twentieth century. Writing in 1933, Leon Trotsky recalled that Germany instigated World War I to organize Europe. But the aims of American imperialism would prove to be far more ambitious. The United States, Trotsky wrote, must organize the world. History is bringing humanity face to face with the volcanic eruption of American imperialism.[33]

### **c) Review of military strategy by Senior Bush**

The first Bush administration responded to the demise of the USSR by initiating a full-scale review of US military strategy. Its overriding objectives were to exploit aggressively the power vacuum left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and, by so doing, establish a geopolitical stranglehold that would prevent any country from emerging as a credible competitor of the United States. The key to this project was to be the use of military power to intimidate and, if necessary, smash any enemy or adversary, existing or potential. In 1992, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and then General Colin Powell called for the implementation of vastly expanded operational objectives for US military forces. It stipulated that



the military should be able to complete one major war in 100 days and two in less than 180 days.

The election of Bill Clinton did not produce any significant change in the increasingly aggressive attitude of American military planners. Under the slogan, Shaping the World through Engagement, the 1990s saw the emergence of a political consensus within both the Democratic and Republican parties that saw military power as the principal means by which the United States would secure long-term global dominance.

However, this insistence on the decisive role of military power arises not from the strength but, rather, the underlying weakness of American capitalism. In essence, militarism is symptomatic of economic and social decline. As it loses, and with good reason, confidence in the economic strength of American capitalism vis-à-vis its major international rivals, and grows increasingly fearful about fissures within the domestic social structure, the ruling elite views military power as the means by which it can counteract all the troubling negative tendencies. As Thomas Friedman of the New York Times wrote in March 1999, "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist McDonald's cannot flourish without a McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.... Without America on duty, there will be no America On Line".

The issue of Iraq has played a central role in high-level discussions on America's strategic ambitions. In a sense, the first war against Iraq occurred just a few months too early for American imperialism. In January-February 1991, with the fate of the USSR still uncertain, the Senior Bush administration

considered it too risky to overstep the boundaries of the UN mandate and attempt unilaterally to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.

But almost from the moment the war had come to a close, there was a sense within powerful sections of the ruling elite that an immense opportunity had been missed. Within the context of the new strategic aim to prevent the emergence of any power or combination of powers that might challenge American domination, the conquest of Iraq came to be seen as a crucial strategic objective. In countless documents produced by right-wing strategists, it was openly argued that the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein would provide the United States with strategic control over oil, the supremely critical resource that is essential to the economies of its potential economic and military rivals in Europe and Japan. Policy specialists George Friedman and Meredith Lebard argued in their influential book **The Coming War with Japan**, published in 1991:

*With oil, the Persian Gulf becomes much more than a regional issue. It becomes the pivot of the world economy. For the U.S., domination of the region would open the door on unprecedented international power. On the other hand, allowing another regional power, such as Iraq or Iran, to seize control of the region and consolidate its own power would close the door on the possibility, unless the U.S were prepared to wage a ground war in the region.*

*During the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US response was explicitly for one purpose: preventing Iraqi domination of the region's oil*



supply. However, it opened up quite another possibility. Success of the U.S. in retaking Kuwait, breaking the Saddam regime, and seizing control of Iraq would place the U.S. in control of a large amount of the world's oil reserves and production. No matter how benignly this power might be used, the U.S. would emerge in control of the international economic system.

...It would be in a position to set production quotas and therefore prices, as well as control the movement of oil. A country like Japan, dependent on the countries within the Straits of Hormuz for over 60 percent of its oil imports, would find that its greatest economic competitor the world's only large economy, and one increasingly bitter toward Japan was in direct control of the Japanese supply of oil. ...

...The leading political power, the U.S., suddenly finds itself in a position where its political power can be used to gain a hammerlock on the international economy.

The Persian Gulf will necessarily become a center of controversy between the U.S. and Japan. Japan's vulnerability to the flow of oil from the area means that increased U.S. power in the region must increase Japanese insecurity. The regionalization of conflict and the regional segmentation of economies will open an important door for the United States: the manipulation of Japan's oil supply could well

*end the challenge that Japanese exports pose to the U.S.[34]*

Except in the American mass media, where discussion of this sensitive issue is virtually taboo, it is widely recognized all over the world that oil, not so-called weapons of mass destruction, is the central preoccupation of the United States. While the war in Afghanistan provided the opportunity for the establishment of new American military bases in Central Asia which is believed to hold the second largest reserves of petroleum in the world the conquest of Iraq would immediately place the second largest reserve of crude oil in the Persian Gulf region under the control of the United States. To quote the ineffable Thomas Friedman, "[H]aving broken Iraq, we own Iraq".

The Bush administration, whose leading personnel consists of people like Cheney who honed their skills as oil industry executives, looks at the Persian Gulf as the potential jewel in the crown of an emerging American empire. If domination of that region were combined with effective control of the oil and natural gas reserves that will be eventually pumped out of Central Asia, the leaders of American imperialism believe that they will have achieved the long-term strategic hegemony that has eluded the United States for so long. This vision of a world dominion, secured through control of strategic global resources, is a reactionary fantasy that has found an enthusiastic audience among broad sections of the Establishment. The frame of mind that prevails within America's political and financial aristocracy is reflected in a new book by Robert Kaplan, entitled *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*. In a typical passage, he declares:



*The more successful our foreign policy, the more leverage America will have in the world. Thus, the more likely that future historians will look back on the twenty-first-century United States as an empire as well as a republic however different from that of Rome and every other empire throughout history. For as the decades and the centuries march on, and the United States has had a hundred presidents, or 150 even, instead of forty-three, and they appear in long lists like the rulers of bygone empires Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman the comparison with antiquity may grow rather than diminish. Rome, in particular, is a model for hegemonic power, using various means to encourage a modicum of order in a disorderly world...[35]*

This drivel is of interest only as a sort of bizarre cultural phenomenon an example of the delusionary state of mind within a ruling elite that has lost all sense of history and of contemporary reality, not to mention common decency.

It does not seem to occur to Mr. Kaplan that to the extent that the United States seeks to implement these fantasies, it will encounter opposition:

*"first of all, from those who are the immediate targets of American depredations the masses in the countries targeted for conquest. There is also the opposition of America's imperialist rivals in Europe and Japan, who simply cannot accept a situation that threatens them with*

*economic strangulation. It is precisely the growing fears over the implications of America's long-term strategic aims the establishment of global domination that find expression in the increasingly open opposition to the US plans for war in Iraq. A likely consequence of a US war against Iraq will be an enormous intensification of inter-imperialist conflicts principally between the United States and its major economic and geopolitical competitors. The stage will be set for World War III".*

#### d) Current American Internationalism

In reality, the U.S. is seeking to recover its preeminent position in the world- preeminent economically, politically and militarily- by both military and commercial means. Thus one might ask: what are the aims behind the recent U.S. construction of military bases in Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia? And behind the war in Iraq? In the first place, and very evidently in the case of oil, there is control over strategic resources. And of course there is the old need to "make the world safe for US corporations and investors", giving military protection to capital investments and the untrammled accumulation of profits. The war against Iraq fulfills a double purpose. In addition to distracting the American electorate, the U.S. wants to control the petroleum resources of the Middle East while at the same time issuing a warning to other nations of the South, who once again are surrounded by American bases. "Behave yourselves, or you may be next!" is the message. This is not a localized war. This is a truly global war, a war for the recolonization of the South.



An analysis of the goals of recent and pending free trade agreements (the WTO, FTAA, NAFTA and bilateral accords), show a great similarity with the above mentioned purposes of the war and militarization. By means of these agreements, northern corporations are to be guaranteed access to Southern markets, eliminating all barriers to the repatriation of profits, and they would also gain control over key resources like oil, water, and germplasm by means of privatization. In other words, recolonization, pure and simple. Thus we might say that trade liberalization is really war by other means.

This leaves us with a question. If the WTO already exists, why does the US also need the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)? That's simple. If the current round of WTO agreements are signed at the next Ministerial meeting to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, it would essentially signify the consolidation of all countries within one global economy. In this global economy, American industry would have to face up to its problems of competitiveness when faced with competitors from Europe, Japan and China. In this context, the U.S. wants to assure itself of an edge, in effect by having 'private reserves' where its corporations have greater access than others. These private reserves are the FTAA, NAFTA and the bilateral accords the U.S. wants to force on individual countries. In these free trade areas, American corporations will have privileged access over their European and Asian counterparts.

With the war on Iraq, with new military bases spread far and wide, and with the FTAA, NAFTA and bilateral trade accords, the USA is seeking the advantage over its competitors in the new war for recolonization of the Third World. A war combining military might with free trade. A war that, in

addition to the terrible toll taken on Southern populations. also has a devastating impact at home. As a result of "free" trade. the family farm is virtually a thing of the past in rural America, while unemployment and inner city desperation are on the rise. With the additional cutbacks of social programs that will inevitably result from the war on Iraq, these problems will intensify. Seen in this context, it is essential to link-up anti-war movements in the South and in the North and also with the world-wide movement against neo-liberal globalization as represented by free trade agreements. "Free" trade is nothing less than war by other means, a war against all peoples, North and South.

## 8. Conclusion

Communication with other cultures has always been central to diplomacy. The essence of the diplomat's work lies in the relations between countries and peoples. Diplomats live abroad and interact with the local culture, and bring their own culture to their hosts. Important decisions in international relations and related fields affect citizens of more than one nation, therefore the question of whether communication between people of different nations is effective and whether all parties emerge with the same understanding is of crucial importance. Lack of knowledge of another culture may confuse or even offend the people we wish to communicate with, making the conclusion of international or bilateral agreements difficult or impossible. This was the situation before the outbreak of the Anglo-American War against Iraq in March 2003.



What one hears today is that "colonization of Iraq" is its "liberation"; "conquest" equals "freedom" for Iraqis; "pillaging" of Iraq equals its "prosperity"; "genocide" equals "humanitarian intervention"; "westoxication" equals "civilization"; and "aggression" equals "pre-emptive strike" in self-defense. This is the communicative uncertainty which apostles of "Operation Shock and Awe" use to gain diplomatic muscle and leverage to launder the pagan ethos of their warrior politics.

Nevertheless, the current U.S. and British posture against Saddam Hussein offers a reprise of Churchill's 1941 crusade against Rashid Ali and the Grand Mufti. Three fundamental arguments advanced to support the call for "regime change" in Iraq—the need to pre-empt Saddam Hussein before he acquires weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them; the requirement to strike a blow at terrorism; finally, a region that contains twenty per cent of the world's oil supply must not be allowed to fall under the control of a demonic regime that will use those resources for malevolent purposes—mirror points made in a different but in many ways eerily similar historical context by Churchill over sixty years ago. As in 1941, many fear that outside mediation that threatens to deflect or delay intervention works to the advantage of the Iraqi regime.

Those who argue against a U.S.-led intervention in the Persian Gulf because a Desert Storm II and its aftermath will leave the Middle East a more turbulent place and absorb a disproportionate amount of U.S. energies and resources for years to come if she were to replicate the concerns of a long-suffering Archibald Wavell. In the event, Iraqi resistance even against a hastily organized, under-armed, outnumbered and poorly supplied Habforce proved illusory, much as Iraqi

resistance collapsed in 1991 before a much more powerful Allied force. Nevertheless, debates in the British government over "how far to go" in Iraq proved remarkably similar to those used in 1991. Unlike President George Bush in 1991, however, in 1941 Churchill opted for "regime change" against a Chief of Staff who would have been content to discredit the Iraqi leadership with a sound thrashing in the hope that the Iraqi people would take matters into their own hands. Despite its inflammatory nationalist rhetoric, support for Rashid Ali's regime proved shallow among the Iraqi people. The same is probably true today; it is unlikely that few beyond Saddam Hussein's inner circle really support the Iraqi dictator.

So, what did Britain gain from its "preventive war" policies in the Middle East? The short answer is that it solidified their position in the Middle East by pre-empting Axis intervention, and bought time to bring a major ally on line, to reverse the tide of war in the Mediterranean theater that in the spring of 1941 was running strongly in the Axis favor, and ultimately emerged among the victors of World War II. But even before the war ended, Britain's primacy in the Middle East had begun to unravel, beginning in Palestine. By the 1950s, Iraq, Iran and Egypt were in turmoil. Therefore, the prevailing historical verdict on Britain's interaction with the Arab world during World War II is that, in its effort to preserve its political base through the invasions of Iraq and Persia, the exile of the Grand Mufti and sponsorship of Zionist counter-terror groups like the *Haganah*, and heavy handed tactics against the young King Farouk in Egypt, Britain fanned the flames of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism that ultimately compromised its long term interests in the Middle East. By way of analogy one can say that Wavell was correct, that a combination of Turkish mediation and the threat of



British force could have produced a compromise with Rachid Ali that would have reserved British forces for more pressing operations and mitigated the legacy of bitterness and resentment felt in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world for the West.

The challenge then, for the United States, will be to discover a strategy to translate a "victory" against Saddam Hussein into a war termination scenario that will stabilize a region historically inclined toward effervescence, and so avoid the requirement for a repeat intervention in a few years' time. What the British experience really tells us is that regime change alone is no panacea. Although it can eliminate the immediate problem posed by Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction and would probably derail whatever nefarious schemes are being hatched in Baghdad, ousting Saddam will not lead to lasting change unless Iraqi civil society and government are placed on a more democratic footing.

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