The Actors’ Symbiosis in the Recurrence of Slums after In-situ Housing Redevelopment Initiatives. Perspectives from Namuwongo Slum, Kampala City

Lydia Nankya¹ and Moses Batanda Mubiru ² (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6997-8929)

¹,² School of the Built Environment, Kyambogo University, Uganda

To cite this article: Nankya, L., & Mubiru M.B. (2023) The Actors’ Symbiosis in the Recurrence of Slums after In-situ Housing Redevelopment Initiatives. Perspectives from Namuwongo Slum, Kampala City. Journal of African Real Estate Research, 8(1), pg. 35–48. https://doi.org/10.15641/jarer.v8i1.1303

Abstract
This paper examines the roles played by various actors in household mobility and the eventual reoccurrence of slums in the city of Kampala amidst the slum upgrading initiatives. The paper adopted a case study approach, utilising a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative techniques. A total of 60 semi-structured questionnaires were administered to the Slum Community, and 40 interviews were held with various key informant respondents. The analysis was primarily done through content analysis. The results indicate that the influence of slum upgrading actors in the low-income household mobility and reoccurrence of the Namuwongo slum was exhibited through three thematic areas. These included tracking the residential mobility tendencies, fit-for-purposes of the upgrading programs/initiatives, and actor collaboration. This paper concludes that actors’ collaboration and participatory involvement in low-income slum-dwelling households should enable the adequate fit-for-purposes of the in-situ upgrading initiatives. This could go a long way in limiting slum reoccurrence as the key drivers of household mobility would be understood and well incorporated into the programs.

Keywords: household mobility, in-situ upgrading, Namuwongo slum, Kampala

1. Introduction
The linkage between the success of In-situ housing redevelopment initiatives and the participation of low-income households in slums in global south cities is not new. For instance, it has been experienced in Bihar, India (Li, Alakshendra, & Smith, 2021), Durban, South Africa (Patel, 2013), and several cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Bah, Faye, Geh, et al., 2018). Concurrently, SDG No.11 indicates that more than half the human population lives in

©2023 The Author(s). Published by UCT Library. This is an open access article under the CC BY 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
cities and predicts that by 2050, two-thirds of humanity's 6.5 billion people will be urban (UN-Habitat, 2009; UNDP). Owing to this prediction, to achieve sustainable development, mandatory emphasis must be put on the significant transformation of how we build and manage urban spaces because the trend of slums is becoming a more important feature of urban life. In that regard, making cities sustainable means creating safe and affordable housing and building resilient societies (Zhongming, Linong, Xiaona, Wangqiang, & Wei, 2020) and economies through investment in public transport, creating green public spaces, and improving urban planning and management in participatory and inclusive ways.

The demand for adequate housing for low-income households has maintained a steady rise. Based on the statistics by the Government of Uganda (GOU (2016) and GOU (2020), by 2022, Uganda is expected to require more than 3 million housing units. However, about 60% of the entire estimated Kampala city population is accommodated by slums (Brown, 2014; Mukiibi, 2012). The current estimates are about 62 slums (Goodfellow, 2010; Jones, Bird, Becky, & Hass, 2016). Rugadya (2007) indicates that the emergence of slums in Kampala City has been gradual and sustained over the years (see also Muchadenyika and Waiswa (2018). Therefore, the systematic upgrading of slums provides new opportunities for city governance in which slums are embraced, tapped into and incorporated into the mainstream urban development agenda to promote sustainable and inclusive cities.

Olthuis, Benni, Eichwede, and Zevenbergen (2015) suggested that slum upgrading is one of the preferred measures to address urban challenges. Such challenges include flooding, accessibility to infrastructure, sanitation, and crime. The challenges, if unaddressed, may lead to persistent slum recurrence due to residential mobility. In-situ slum upgrading, therefore, has been credited for being practical and humane (Coelho, 2016; Mahadevia, Bhatia, & Bhatt, 2018). In suggesting implementing policies for slum upgrading redevelopments, Handzic (2010) focused on legalised land tenure, commonly known as land regularisation. Tomlinson (2015) emphasised community-led slum upgrading through sites and services or a redevelopment approach. At the same time, Olthuis et al. (2015) emphasised location, spatial (such as locational attributes and growth patterns of slums), and participatory approaches.

There are several slum upgrading initiatives in urban Uganda, which, though well-intentioned, suffered frustrating implementations. Dobson, Muhammed, and Mugisa (2014) noted that Uganda introduced the National Slum Upgrading Strategy and Action Plan (NSUSAP) in 2008 through the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, with the prominent one being the Namuwongo slum upgrading project. Muchadenyika and Waiswa (2018) argued that the intention of the 1986 Namuwongo Low-Cost Housing and Slum Upgrading Project (NLCHSUP) was advanced to achieve SDG 11. It was to benefit the low-income slum dwellers by improving household livelihoods and offering them access to better yet affordable housing. However, it is notable that after a few years of the project implementation, there were indications of slum recurrence in the immediate neighbourhoods of the Namuwongo slum upgrading project. A proportion of the inhabitants (project beneficiaries) stayed in the project area of Namuwongo. A considerable number of would-be project beneficiaries disposed of their allotted land parcels and instead migrated to neighbouring slums and unoccupied spaces. Other households extended a short distance away to Namuwongo wetland, which they reclaimed and established another slum at Kasanvu.

As a result of the foregoing, it is essential to thoroughly understand the drivers that pushed the perceptions of the slum dwellers, for many of them to dump the well-intentioned project and end up resettling and recreating another slum in the immediate neighbourhood. To appreciate this better, one must understand the central role of the interplay of different actors in sustaining slum upgrading initiatives. This paper explains how the actors’ reluctance to appreciate the
unique household mobility drivers potentially necessitates slum reoccurrences in the wake of in-situ slum upgrading initiatives.

2. In-situ Slum Upgrading, Household Mobility Tendencies and Slum Redevelopments' Recurrence. A Theoretical Understanding

Slums are widely appreciated as urban areas characterised by poverty and substandard living conditions developed outside planning regulations and legally sanctioned housing and land markets (Goussous & Tayoun, 2022; Rukmana, 2018). The UN-Habitat (2010) additionally associates such a slum environment as a physical and spatial manifestation of urban poverty and intra-city inequality. Such association shows how crucial slum expansion should be curbed during city planning by 2030, either through in-situ upgrading existing slums or preventing new ones from springing up.

In-situ upgrading initiatives are prioritised in sub-Saharan African cities (Bah, Faye, & Geh, 2018; Dasgupta & Lall, 2009). Such upgrading programs ordinarily involve several initiatives, such as land regularisation through title deed formation and acquisition, services and utility improvement, including drainage, water, electricity, roads, and sanitation. Others include political and social inclusion through compensation of land owners and consideration of the rights of vulnerable groups, i.e. women and children. Key to these is the collaboration of stakeholders, directly and indirectly, involved in the upgrading process (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Conceptual Summation on Actor-collaboration in the Implementation of In-situ Slum Upgrading Project of Namuwongo

- **Housing Finance Bank**
  - Financed the Project.
  - Received Complex requirements for acquiring financial assistance.

- **Policy Makers at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development**
  - Policy making, direction and guidelines.

- **Area Local Leadership**
  - Linking the households with the policy makers and the financial bank
  - Representation of Household voices and communicating of higher decisions to Households.
  - Undertake due-diligence and participate in vetting Households

- **Land holder and Tenant Households**
  - Priority given to Mailo holder and sitting tenants.
  - Tenants with financial capacity were the last option

- **Local Steering Committee**
  - Allocation of plots
  - Vetting qualifying Households

**Affordability**
- Selection of wrong Households

- **Complaints regarding Bribery Allegations and Incapcible Roads**

**Concerns on**
- Selection of wrong Households
For a successful program of in-situ slum upgrading, essential collaboration among actors had to prevail. However, the linkage between the different actors was riddled with bottlenecks, primarily arising out of role overlaps and, at times, misinformation. This led to complaints of bribery, affordability concerns about the provided houses, and the selection of the wrong beneficiary households. In a way, the discontent arising from such lacuna, when unsatisfactorily handled, often led to households abandoning the project and relocating to recreate a slum in the nearby neighbourhood.

Generally, In-situ housing redevelopment may not be widely distinguished from other slum upgrading processes (Bolton, 2020). However, Turley, Saith, Bhan, Rehfues, and Carter (2013) provide that, in its basic appreciation, In-situ housing redevelopment aids the improvement of an existing area, such as improving and installing basic infrastructure like water, sanitation and accessibility while incurring minimal relocations of households. Muchadenyika and Waiswa (2018) further indicate that the three (3) aspects of in-situ slum upgrade include policies, leadership and politics. Such variables manifest within governance context and actor interplay when deciding upon collective goals for the society and devising the mechanisms through which those goals can be attained.

An adequate understanding of the mobility trends of urban households, especially low-income ones, is essential for achieving success and fit-for-purpose in-situ upgrading programs. Low-income households in sub-Saharan Africa are commonly tied to their locations by the social capital accumulating over time (Limbumba, 2010; Mubiru, Nuhu, Kombe, & Mtwangi Limbumba, 2022). That is why any move to formal housing, much of which is being developed on the edges of cities, can potentially expose such households to new financial shocks, spatial dislocation, and the disruption of jobs and livelihoods (Williams, Charlton, Coelho, Mahadevia, & Meth, 2022). At the same time, given their socioeconomic status, low-income households have particular preferences to expect in availed housing. As Mubiru, Nuhu, Kombe, and Mtwangi Limbumba (2022) indicate, such households will pursue relocation when such preferences are met, primarily upon the influence of their social networks. Notably, once the social capital has adequately been accumulated, the households are expected to be largely immobile, with the rare relocations experienced in the immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, the different actors in the upgrading processes must appreciate the mobility dynamics and drivers of such households in the to-be upgraded slums through a participatory (Patel, 2013) and inclusive upgrading exercise. Once the concerned in-situ upgrading actors do not adequately handle the mobility dynamics, there is often a risk of the reoccurrence of slums near the upgraded projects.

In contributing to the slum mobility challenge, Badmos et al. (2020) suggest that while it is essential to curb slum growth, the approach utilised is crucial. They advocate the need for a system approach to sustainable development where slums are considered an integral part of the city. The projects should be particular on affecting the living standards and opportunities of the slum inhabitants and influencing and being influenced by the developmental perspectives of the cities and societies in which they occur.

Badmos et al. (2020) give reference to the theories on human mobility in slums, which can be summarised into four (4) clusters:

- "Movement of people from rural area to urban slums, work and then move to the outskirts of the city due to improvement in their socioeconomic status (upward housing mobility of migrants)
• Movement of people from rural areas to urban slums, work and then move to other slums due to inability to improve their socioeconomic status (slum as a sink)
• Movement of people from rural areas to urban slums, work and stay in the same slum all their lives (slum as final destination)
• Movement of people from rural area to urban slums, work and move back to the rural area."

Badmos et al. (2020) give interesting insights. It notes that although it would have been expected that migration to urban slums would follow the first theory, the shortage of affordable housing in developing country cities may permanently put many migrants in the same or similar slums, even if their income level increases. An example is given by Wesolowski et al. (2012), showing that slum dwellers in Nairobi move within the slums following the third theory, implying that slums are probably not a transition stage for prospective migrants but rather permanent throughout their lifetime.

Therefore, it is noteworthy that the existing literature, to an extent, highlights the mobility dynamics of slum-dwelling households. However, this paper extends this perspective by bringing to the fore how such mobility uniquenesses play out, fuelled by the different actors, especially amidst or subsequent to slum upgrading projects.

3. Methods

3.1 Study Design and Approach

A case study design was adopted for this study. According to Yin (1984), the case study research strategy is an empirical inquiry that examines a contemporary phenomenon within its aspects of real life, especially in circumstances when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Using a case study is derived from researchers’ desire to understand the real-life phenomenon in-depth. Still, such understanding is incorporated with vital circumstantial conditioning exceedingly relevant to the study phenomenon.

The case study approach was deemed useful in allowing the researchers to undertake an in-depth assessment of the role of various actors in consciously or unconsciously influencing the housing location mobility of low-income households and the re-emergence of slums in the aftermath of In-situ housing redevelopment projects. This paper adopted a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches, though, to a more considerable degree, it was qualitative. Largely qualitative approaches like this one flourish when in-depth tales are needed to thoroughly understand a phenomenon (Krefting, 1991; Patton, 2015). This choice is important, especially when dealing with a population segment whose records are scanty, like the urban slum dwellers (Mubiru, Nuhu, Kombe, & Limbumba, 2022).

This paper's key units of analysis were the households that relocated to the neighbouring areas and recreated the slum after the Namuwongo in-situ slum upgrading exercise. The areas include Wabigalo, Railway reserves, Kisugu and Bukasa. Notably, evidence on mobility trends of low-income slum-dwelling households and how several actors inter-play in influencing slum re-emergence is scanty. Therefore, the Namuwongo settlement and its immediate neighbourhood were an ideal setting to gather evidence for an adequate understanding of the phenomenon.
The Namuwongo slum is one of the suburbs in Kampala that were highlighted as slum neighbourhoods of the city (Goodfellow, 2010). It is located in Makindye Division, one of the five administrative divisions of Kampala city. Lugogo borders it to the north, Nakawa to the northeast, Bugoloobi to the east, Muyenga to the southeast, Kabalagala to the south, Kibuli to the west and Kololo to the northwest. The neighbourhood is approximately 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) by road, southeast of the Kampala Central Business District. North of the railway line in Namuwongo sits a slum called Soweto comprising seven (7) zones: Industrial Area View, Go-Down, Kasanvu, Namuwongo B, Namuwongo A, Kanyogoga/Masengere and Yoweri Kaguta (YOKA). The composition of households has a socioeconomic mix. The mix is because of the diverse locations and regions where several households migrated before settling in the case study area. Additionally, the households primarily undertake informal economic activities within the settlement and commute to the Kampala City centre.

3.2 Study Population and Sampling Procedures

The population in this study included slum dwellers in Namuwongo, specifically those residing in zones near the slum upgrading project area. Additionally, it engaged local council leaders of the area and key informants, including community-based organisations and practitioners like valuers and physical planners.

The Namuwongo Slum, according to UBOS (2014), has a population of 20,000 people. However, the researchers tracked back the population of Namuwongo Slum as it was in 1991. This enabled obtaining a realistic representation of the primary targets of the project in 1993 at its inception. Given the growth rate as indicated in Table 1, the population of Namuwongo as per computation in the year census 1991 at 3.2% was 18,773 people.

### Table 1: Population Growth Rates 1969-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-censal Population Increase (Millions)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Annual Increase (000s)</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Annual Growth Rate (percent)</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UBOS (2014)*

Given the challenges in tracking the present locations of the targeted households and their mobility, we employed an exponential discriminative snowball sampling strategy. The exponential discriminative snowballing was also used because of limited data in the local community office. This was vital as it enabled the study to align with the aim by sieving participants from proposed referrals. When local community leaders lacked adequate data, they sought guidance from resourceful community members, especially the household heads who have stayed in the area since the upgrading project. After identifying a few participants through the local council leaders in the area, these led us to other relevant households. The eventual sample was determined by data saturation.

Unquestionably, the snowball strategy is associated with limitations regarding eventual representativeness and possible distortion in instances where the researcher delays engaging contacted respondents. That notwithstanding, this method has been tasted as relevant and dependable when it is impractical to compile a list of elements composing a population (Babbie, 2007). This sampling is also a widely used technique recommended for research
involving hard-to-reach populations (Van Meter, 1990). Therefore, the exponential discriminative snowballing strategy was used since there are no organised and reliable records on the current whereabouts of low-income households formerly targeted by the Namuwongo upgrading project to sample out using other techniques.

Upon realisation of the data saturation, the total sample size was realised to be 100 respondents. Sixty (60) respondents were slum dwellers who relocated after the upgrade. Furthermore, key informant respondents included ten (10) local area representatives, ten (10) programs technical staff and managers from community-based organisations, and five (5) and four (4) urban managers from the Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development and Kampala Capital City Authority respectively. Additionally, four (4) private urban land economists, four (4) private physical planners, and three (3) financial managers from the Housing Finance Bank were engaged.

The 60 slum dwellers and household heads were served with pre-elaborated questionnaires for those who were literate. The researchers administered the questions in an interview format for the illiterate respondents. Additionally, we obtained records of the household heads targeted by the 1993 project from the local council area offices. This helped sieve out only the relevant households by double-checking whether the upgrading project targeted them and later relocated thereafter. Furthermore, we interviewed forty (40) key informant respondents.

3.3 Data Analysis

During analysis, primary data was structured, coded and analysed using measures of central tendency like frequency and percentage. Qualitative data from interviews were analysed and presented in a descriptive form based on specific themes. Before that, with the respondents' consent, interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. Some responses were quoted verbatim in the descriptive analysis as care was taken not to lose the study's primary objective. To protect the confidentiality of the respondents, respondents were allocated pseudonyms.

4. Results and Discussion

From the information gathered with the aid of both qualitative and quantitative processes, the influence of actors in the low-income household mobility and reoccurrence of the Namuwongo slum was exhibited through four thematic areas. These included tracking the residential mobility tendencies, fit-for-purposes of the upgrading programs/initiatives, actor coordination and the mismatch in expectation and preferences between the program actors and the low-income households.

4.1 Residential Mobility Tendencies of Low-income Households

A key intention of this paper was to understand the residential location history and dynamics of low-income slum-dwelling households. The residential mobility tendencies of the households in the case study area had socioeconomic connotations. Firstly, after gathering responses from the area's local leaders and the household heads, it was found that no traceable cultural roots link households' hereditary origins to the area. Approximately 85% of the respondent households reported having migrated to the area without a prior connection to a relative. Many prioritised the area as an easy link to access the Kampala central business district. Thus, the Namuwongo slum area, based on its proximity to the Kampala city centre, worked as a magnet for households from other areas within and outside the city.
After the slum upgrading project, many low-income households moved to other areas in the neighbourhood of the Namuwongo slum. The majority of the participants relocated to areas such as Kisugu. The households that previously stayed in Bukasa ranked second, and those that remained in Wabigalo ranked third (Figure 2). Some households had initially migrated from villages and settled in the case study area to obtain economic opportunities or upon marriage.

**Figure 2: Areas to Which Households Relocated**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relocated areas</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bukasa</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisugu</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Reserve</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Areas</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wabigalo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Primary Data, 2022*

During one of the interview sessions, a local leader said:

"Most of the people you are seeing here are new. Most of them came to work in Kampala and the industrial area. Namuwongo was a perfect area to reside since the rent is cheap and transport costs are low, and some of them even walk to work."

The above experience implies that the Namuwongo area acted as an affordable entry point for new urban low-income households migrating from the upcountry. Secondly, upon settlement in the area, gathering social networks and getting attached to economic livelihoods, households disliked long-distance relocations compliant with Gyimah (2001). With time, the initial settlers of the project area were later joined by squatters around the railway and migrants seeking better opportunities in the city but with insufficient funds to afford decent housing. The economic activities to attract new and existing dwellers were mainly in the nearby factories located in the zoned industrial area. The mobility trajectories of the slum-dwelling households were influenced in two main ways:

4.1.1 Residential Mobility due to Changes in Economic and Social Living Conditions

The participants indicated that the economic livelihood activities of the area were interrupted by the in-situ upgrading project. Initially, the small-scale businesses that households maintained within the project area had assured customers from within the settlement community. The desire to maintain such customers and networks has made many low-income households stay in the neighbourhood for a long time without long-distance relocations. However, experiences from the relocated household heads exhibited an effect of the relocations on the households’ socioeconomic livelihoods. For instance, the upgrading project led many customers to abandon the project area and relocate to neighbouring areas. The households considered such customers vital for their businesses, which were situated within the settlement.
One household's head stated:

"When my customers relocated, I was forced to relocate my shop to near where they went. Otherwise, my business was going to collapse. The occupants of the upgraded housing did not wish to buy my products; those who liked them had relocated."

Additionally, the drastic change in their standard of living led to complaints of their farming lifestyle being forced onto food buyers. As one of the household heads said:

"We could not depend on Agriculture for survival anymore; our crops had been cut down after compensation; our option was to search for alternatives."

Another respondent indicated:

"Most of the Bataka (landholders) left. The rich that moved here did not have any social relations with us. You can't even share a simple household item with them."

The preceding experiences imply that the actors in the in-situ upgrading exercise were unaware of the unique socioeconomic livelihoods of the low-income slum-dwelling households. At the same time, the steering committee members were strict on the drastic change in the livelihoods in the newly upgraded settlement, as a steering committee member said:

"We sensitised those households to avoid operating activities like it was in the old slum environment. Some of them were uncomfortable with this, and they chose to relocate themselves, as they mostly used to act in clusters of peers."

Additionally, the responses signalled the presence of a web of local social networks among the settlement households, especially regarding the search for options to sustain their livelihoods. However, the in-situ project and its resultant displacement and relocation appeared to disentangle the social cohesion, disrupt their social capital, and disintegrate their social demographics as many of the new residents lived privately in enclosed residences. Additionally, the migrants into the project area were from different ethnicities, creating a cultural mix. These residents faced a tough decision to either stay in the project area, which they could not afford, or relocate to the nearby area, where some of their friends had moved to, which they did. Eventually, the pre-existing social networks shifted to the neighbouring areas, leading to the reoccurrence of the former Namuwongo slum.

4.1.1.1 Choosing to Shift vs Not to Shift from the Project Area

Choosing to shift or otherwise from the project area may have been deliberate, but in many instances, it was influenced by peer neighbourhood households. Based on the household responses, the respondents indicated that the majority of their peers decided to shift rather than remain in the project area. Upon inquiry as to why this was so, their responses ranged from challenges faced by the households to make down payment for the upgraded land/houses—occasionally attributed to their lack of stable household income, restrictive proposed housing structures and changes in the economic and social livelihood that made them feel as misfits.
Such experiences also signal the shortfalls by the implementing actors to appreciate the housing affordability dynamics of the slum dwellers and craft fit-for-purpose strategies to provide affordable yet adequate shelter options. The eventual shifts by the targeted households in relatively undeveloped neighbourhoods signalled the failure to fill such an affordability gap.

The gaps in harmonising affordability strategies to attain adequate housing while at the same time winning the goodwill of the intended recipients have been a concern in the literature. Generally, July, Rakhi, Maureen, Somik, and Akie (2005) argue that strategies to help the one billion people worldwide who live in slum settlements have mainly focused on slum upgrading. There has also been less attention on what enables slum dwellers to transition into the formal housing sector, focusing on affordability and flexible financing avenues. Such a scenario would have dual benefits of improving service access and escaping social stigma.

Other Scholars have discussed the contribution of the shortage of affordable housing and income levels to residential mobility tendencies of the slum dwellers under the first and third trajectories of residential mobility (Keunen & Ley, 2022; Yemmafouo, Ngouanet, Keumo Songong, Dijenk Teufack, & Djuidje, 2017). However, the mentality of slum dwellers needs to be at the centre of the discussion. Even though the city centre is the epitome of economic activity (Alonso, 1964; Dale, 2008), other aspects like household location in the periphery need to be sensitised to the slum dwellers by the responsible actors. This is where the Government actors' role in providing affordable and sustainable transport systems comes in, yet scholars have not thoroughly discussed this gap.

It is crucial to note that this discussion aligns with the housing redevelopment approach of slum upgrading. The success of such projects relies on monitoring, evaluation and implementation frameworks that are effective, participatory, transparent and integrated at all levels and, contrary to the above, lead to mobility of the inhabitants, leading to the recurrence of slums.

4.1.2 Influence of Household Social Networks

In executing their roles and ensuring that affordable and adequate housing options are provided to the slum dwellers with limited inconvenience, the actors had to be cognisant of the social milieu of the settlement households. The eventual household shifts to the neighbourhood signalled this was not adequately complied with. The social networks among the low-income slum dwellers played a fundamental role in the household mobility and eventual re-emergence of the Namuwongo slum. Kapoor, Lall, Lundberg, and Shalizi (2004) highlight that the choice of residential location by slum dwellers is bent on staying close to those sharing common socio-demographic characteristics such as language and religion, among others. This trait was exhibited in the project-affected persons of the Namuwongo slum. They occasionally indicated that they got information from relatives and family about the new area. Such dwellers, thus, sought shelter where rent and land (Kibanja) were relatively cheaper and where no restrictions were put on the nature of construction. One of the household heads said:

"I was given shelter by the friend of my late husband here in Kasanvu. They later sold me the portion I had occupied and allowed me to pay in instalments."

The preceding experience implies that relocation and eventually reconstructing a new slum was the viable alternative. Most low-income households, "meant-to-be beneficiaries", could not afford to stay within the project area because of the seemingly unfavourable conditions. They
thus sought comfort in the areas their peers had migrated to. This experience resonates with what one of the local leaders said:

"Most of these households are connected by friends, relatives or/and tribemates. So once one of them makes a decision, they likely convince the others to follow."

Also, as noted by Badmos et al. (2020), the location of a slum may also be a function of tribal affiliation and family linkage. Such assertion complies with an earlier observation by Mayaki (2013) that migrants prefer to settle in neighbourhoods with similar socio-cultural backgrounds. This, therefore, makes it essential for slum upgrading actors to be sensitive to the socio-cultural dynamics of the dwellers before proceeding with any initiatives that directly affect such households.

4.2 Fit-for-Purposeness of the Upgrading Programs/Initiatives

4.2.1 Communication on the Procedures for Plot Allocations to Households

It was necessary for adequate information flow and communication to ensure that the project beneficiaries appreciated the actors' intentions in the process. Several responses from household respondents echoed the inadequate communication flows. For instance, several households were unaware that they could actually apply for land parcels if they had the potential to make such payments. Some mentioned that they learnt later on that they were the primary beneficiaries since they were residents of Namuwongo as one of them said:

"For us, we thought our landlords were the ones supposed to apply."

Another one also said:

"But even if I had known that tenants were also beneficiaries, I did not have money to make the deposit payment."

Furthermore, a participant from the Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development indicated inadequate sensitisation to emphasise the benefits of tenure and how to handle the available financing options.

That implies that the ineffective enlightenment on the criteria for plot formalisation and housing acquisition to the targeted communities created a distance between the low-income dwellers who perceived the project as 'not theirs' and the inadequate research to establish the most appropriate financing options that would enable house acquisition in the upgraded project housing.

4.2.2 Perception Regarding Proposed Housing Structures

The inadequate sensitisation by the actors and limited participation from the household level bred a perception of a non-compliant and seemingly non-affordable housing solution. Eventually, the household responses indicated shortcomings of the housing appropriateness to the dwellers' expected preferences, and the conditions for the housing access created the households' unwarranted dislike of the upgrading project. By setting house acquisition conditions that some low-income dwellers viewed as segregative, the respondents classified
this as a strategy to displace them from the project area. At the same time, the project implementers, in liaison with the local leaders, packaged this as a forceful affair with limited inclusivity. For instance, there was fear created by the threatening letters received from the steering committee. The threats concerned the reallocation of plots allotted to some of the dwellers due to non-compliance to the covenants of the 5-year grace period, technically known as the initial term of the lease. That made even some of the dwellers who had picked up the proposal of plot acquisition backtrack on the idea as their income stability to afford instalments was not guaranteed. Eventually, this period influenced the decision of the respondents to either stay within the project area or relocate to affordable and more comfortable options. The targeted beneficiaries indicated they had to relocate after the grace period due to failure to develop the allotted plots. They lacked funds to construct according to proposed housing standards. A participant said:

"My husband had died, I had the responsibility of taking care of our children, I couldn't afford the program because I didn't have money, so I couldn't comply to the grace period of 5 years."

Another lady said:

"My father had given me where to stay and unfortunately later died, but only my brothers were given plots because they were in a position to pay, and yet I also had a share on my father's land."

At times, with threats of losing entirely on the funds injected so far and yet being unable to complete as per the leasing agreements, some allottees were sold out of goodwill and bought elsewhere. A respondent said:

"Failure to comply with requirements led to the cancellation of a beneficiary and no money was refunded in case things turned out like that. Also, we could not petition the LC1 because we feared that the committee had the final say in deciding the matters regarding the project."

Therefore, some dwellers were made to sell their allocated plots with the narrative that they had invested in so little "application fee". Thus, if anyone was willing to pay the down payment and also pay the beneficiary for the parcel allotted to them, it was a start elsewhere in an affordable environment with perpetual interest, unlike leasehold, which necessitated annual payment.

### 4.3 Collaboration Among Key Slum Upgrading Actors

The in-situ upgrading of the Namuwongo slum necessitated the collaboration of several actors at different levels. Some key actors included Landholders of other interests, Local area leadership, Policy makers at the Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development, the Housing Finance Bank that financed the process and the local steering committee. The different actors needed to execute their roles openly, well-coordinated, and inclusively to achieve the targeted users’ success and sense of ownership. However, efficient collaboration between the actors was vital if the intended objectives of the upgrading scheme were to be achieved.

#### 4.3.1 The Steering Committee

Muchadenyika and Waiswa (2018) assert that the three (3) aspects of slum upgrade include policies, leadership and politics. Such aspects manifest within a governance context involving
deciding upon collective goals for the society and devising the mechanisms through which those goals can be attained.

Regarding leadership, politics and policies, the respondents reported that a steering committee responsible for allocating the plots was created for the smooth running of the project. Responses indicate further that during the vetting process, applicants aged 18 and above who were judged to be of good standing were interviewed by the steering committee before plot allocation. The committee team were expected to know the financial capability of applicants. This due diligence was done through the local area representatives on the committee, who were expected to possess adequate knowledge of their residents. However, the majority of respondents expressed their reservations regarding the due diligence process that was undertaken. They dejectedly announced that their applications were excluded because they did not have the potential to afford the program. Hence, the facts gathered were deemed not to reflect the socioeconomic attributes of the targeted beneficiaries.

Furthermore, the participants were asked who was given priority by the committee for plot allocation during the vetting process. They indicated that the Private Mailo owners with titles on the land to be used for redevelopment ranked first. It was presumed that their acceptance determined the success of the project. The sitting tenants/ Kibanja that had improvements on the land were considered second. Then, non-resident Government officials and tenants with income capability were considered last.

The researchers, however, established that approval of a beneficiary was on condition that a deposit had been made to Housing Finance Company. Incidentally, most residents, referred to as "farmers" by most respondents (about 70%), claimed not to have the capacity to pay the deposit payment (omusingo). Therefore, such households only paid the application form's fee and later sold to well-to-do non-resident individuals who supposedly could make the deposit payment. However, if many of the low-income slum dwellers had been involved in the planning and questioned about their preferences, most suggested other approaches. One of the respondents expressed that:

"They would have relocated us to another neighbourhood and let us come back when they have developed this place with low-cost houses like what they had promised, and we would have been able to pay little rent for the period that would have been stated."

Such a disconnect between the implementer's priorities and the users’ expectations arose from inadequate actor coordination and participation. For a better actor collaboration, Reddel and Woolcock (2004) and Goetz and Jenkins (2001) associate the success of national policies with how Central Governments effectively engage other stakeholders. Such stakeholders like authorities, civil society, communities, and the private sector can assist in monitoring, evaluating, and implementing efforts and bridge the gap between people's needs and national policy setting.

The laxity in the actors' execution of roles was also manifested through the lack of trust arising from the bribery allegations levelled by the beneficiaries. Trust concerns affected the steering committee's credibility. One of the respondents expressed that:

"For us, we noticed that most of the project awardees were not indigenous people, and also the leaders in the project were seen to own more than one plot after implementation."
Another said:

"The communication was not effective. I used to hear most of the information through rumours, and also, some officials prioritised personal interests during the allocation of plots."

Such revelations, therefore, signal a gap in the program's implementation by the responsible actors. Trust issues and a combined disconnect of actors often lead targeted beneficiaries to harbour attitudes of exclusion from well-meaning projects. Such sentiments are shared by Danso-Wiredu and Midheme (2017), who have experience in Ghana and Kenya. The end result of such sentiments, if not curtailed, is the decision of the low-income households to relocate to other areas where they re-manufacture the slum neighbourhoods.

Further concerns from the respondents also related to some of the unfinished project roads, yet this was one of the outputs of the upgrading process. Additionally, concerns like inadequate community participation in creating the project design (Davidson, Johnson, Lizarralde, Dikmen, & Slivinski, 2007), explain why there is currently mixed-up development as the community did not agree to the building standards proposed. Issues pointed out about the allocation process, which was termed as biased and unfair to the underprivileged residents in the community, clearly highlight the residential mobility of the beneficiaries of the slum upgrading project, which drove them to the creation of another slum.

The concerns raised by the poor households are buttressed by Kanji, Cotula, Hilhorst, Toulmin, and Witten (2005), who highlight that the poorer groups are consequently excluded if the costs have to be borne by those seeking formal title. This is factual as the respondents emphasised that they didn't seek financial support from the project finance manager despite their knowledge of the criteria. Such reservation was because of the perceived complexity of the requirements necessary for acquiring financial assistance, including the local council letter, an account with HFB, proof of allocation, a mortgage form, proof of an income source and a letter of approval from the steering committee. The steering committee team exploited such red tape to allocate to people who wouldn't have passed the criteria yet, leaving out the targeted households.

5. Conclusion

This paper has laid bare the role which the omissions and/or commissions of the various actors in the in-situ slum upgrading processes play in influencing the low-income household mobility and reoccurrence of the Namuwongo slum in Kampala city. Such connection was linked through three thematic areas. These included tracking the residential mobility tendencies, fit-for-purposes of the upgrading programs/initiatives, and the actual actor collaboration in the execution of their duties. It was observed that the low-income slum dwellers of Namuwongo exhibited unique socially connected attributes that influenced their lifestyles and the economic activities they pursued. Such attributes led to the nature of their short-distance neighbourhood mobility. That, combined with the inadequate sensitisation by the implementing actors of the project, created a sense of mismatch in expectations from the initiatives. This would have been sorted through the adequate coordination of actors. Still, at times, the actors collided, and the coordination often had shortfalls that, in a way, affected the efficient delivery of the in-situ upgrading idea.

Despite the access to land initiatives and economic and social livelihood restoration associated with in-situ upgrading, several bottlenecks were notable. Notably, the residential mobility
tendencies of low-income households in the Namuwongo neighbourhood slum are generally related to the responsible actors' inadequate social integration for inclusive planning. Such detachment land lack of inter-actor coordination resulted in some social groups and weaker community sections being planned for without adequate identification; the planning actors did not sufficiently understand their characteristics. Eventually, their concerns and needs were not properly focused and aligned with the preferences and requirements of the target beneficiaries. As a result, low-income slum dwellers tend to move to places equivalent to their previous status quo. They (including some project beneficiaries) thus were influenced by their local social networks to relocate and resettle in what they considered more affordable land in the immediate neighbourhood of Namuwongo.

The findings of this research are likely to guide the key aspects in the in-situ slum upgrading processes in sub-Saharan Africa and generally in the global south cities. Aspects such as social networks and the unique socioeconomic attributes of low-income households are vital in influencing the households' urban mobility. If considered by the implementing actors, these can enable fit-for-purpose in-situ slum upgrading exercises.

It is crucial, thus, to note that until the existing land and housing policies are fine-tuned to enhance the elimination barriers for low-income households, the twin global objectives of upgrading slums and preventing the upspringing of new ones from resonating to recurrence will be more challenging to realise. Therefore, in the policy formulation process, there is a necessity for exhaustive consultation from the analysts, technocrats, and other stakeholders before these decisions are made. Such would ensure harmony and proper coordination during implementation. Furthermore, coordinating actors/stakeholders while implementing the In-situ housing redevelopment approach to slum upgrading is vital. This would help any community accept the program proposed as miscommunication and ignorance, amongst other factors, prompt their mobility tendencies, which may sometimes be involuntary.

References
Bolton, L. (2020). 'Sites and services', and in-situ slum upgrading.


Williams, G., Charlton, S., Coelho, K., Mahadevia, D., & Meth, P. (2022). (Im) mobility at the margins: low-income households' experiences of peripheral resettlement in India and South Africa. *Housing Studies, 37*(6), 910-931.

